More than twelve years have elapsed since China began its efforts to enact a comprehensive antitrust law. Today, drafts of the law are still being debated, with no real signs of enactment. Such a protracted legislative process is highly unusual in China, and can only be explained by the controversy the draft law generates. After a brief review of China's current competition policy and the new draft antitrust law, this paper discusses the fundamental issues in China's economy that give rise to the challenges facing China's antitrust policymakers in enacting the new antitrust law. These issues include the role of state-owned enterprises, perceived excessive competition in China's economy, mergers and acquisitions by foreign companies, the treatment of administrative monopolies, and the enforcement of the antitrust law. While those controversies create significant policy issues for China, they do not constitute valid objections to the enactment of the new antitrust law. Meanwhile, it will be important for China to recognize that the new antitrust law alone will not be sufficient to fully realize its goal of promoting competition in its economy; other reforms will be necessary as well. China will be better off by moving swiftly to enact the new antitrust law, while keeping the momentum to engage in those other reforms.
China should take an incremental approach and move swiftly to enact the AML, while keeping the momentum to actively engage in those related reforms.
This article is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief overview of China's current antitrust rules as well as a summary of the major components of the proposed AML.
Section III discusses China's economic, regulatory, and legal contexts. Section IV focuses on the fundamental issues in China's economy that give rise to the challenges facing China's antitrust policymakers in enacting the AML. Section V concludes.
II. CHINA'S CURRENT AND PROPOSED ANTITRUST LAWS
A.
China's Current Antitrust Rules
China's current competition policy is found in a number of specific laws and administrative rules. The most comprehensive of these is the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, promulgated in 1993. 3 The Anti-Unfair Competition Law contains some provisions that are usually found in antitrust law, such as prohibition of tie-in sales in Article 12 and prohibition of price fixing and bid rigging in Article 15. But the Anti-Unfair Competition Law also addresses many other issues, including bribery, deceptive advertising, coercive sales, and appropriation of business secrets. To a large extent, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law is more like a consumer protection law than an antitrust law.
Antitrust provisions are also scattered in more specialized laws. For example, the Commercial Banking Law passed in 1995 includes an article that prohibits banks from engaging in "improper competition." 4 The Price Law passed in 1997 has provisions against "improper pricing behaviors" including price fixing, predatory pricing and price discrimination, to name a which was meant to reign in widespread abuse of monopoly positions by public utility companies.
• In April 2001, the State Council, China's cabinet, issued the Rules on Prohibiting
Regional Blockades in Market Economic Activities. 9 This regulation deals with a major form of administrative monopoly where local government agencies deliberately discriminate against products and services provided by other localities and oftentimes simply deny them access to the local market. prohibit the abuse of "market dominance" and infers dominance through "market share in the relevant market, substitutability of relevant goods, and ease of new entry." The Rules also prohibit price coordination, supply restriction, bid rigging, vertical price restraint, below-cost-pricing and price discrimination as abuses of dominance. Finally, the Rules prohibit government agencies from "illegally intervening" in market price determinations.
These regulations generally do not have a clear and credible enforcement mechanism, and their implementation has been largely ineffective.
To address rising concerns about foreign acquisitions of Chinese companies, six government agencies jointly issued the Rules on Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors ("M&A Rules") in 2006. 11 Article 51 of the M&A Rules lays out the four conditions under which pre-merger notification to China's Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM") and the SAIC is required. The four conditions include thresholds that relate to annual sales, the number of enterprises the foreign party has previously acquired in related industries and the merging parties' market shares. The M&A Rules, however, suffer from a number of deficiencies.
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To aid the implementation of the M&A Rules, in March, 2007, MOFCOM posted on its web site the Antitrust Filing Guidelines. 13 The Guidelines in most part resemble similar guidelines and procedures adopted by other jurisdictions and are helpful for parties who wish to
understand when and what to file. However, the filing requirements in the Guidelines seem to be overly burdensome to merging parties.
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B. China's Proposed Antimonopoly Law
As can be seen from the discussion above, China's current laws and regulations dealing with antitrust-related issues are fragmented. Oftentimes, provisions of those laws and regulations are vague and repetitive, and the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement is greatly reduced by the existence of multiple enforcement agencies authorized by different laws. In part as a response to the perceived shortcomings of China's current antitrust rules, China has been trying to enact a comprehensive antitrust law, the Antimonopoly Law ("AML"), to consolidate the antitrust provisions into a uniform set of rules. Chapter states that trade associations are subject to the AML, agricultural activities are generally exempted, and an intellectual property right is not to be regarded as a per se unlawful monopoly but the abuse of such rights to restrict competition is subject to the AML.
III. CHINA'S ECONOMIC, REGULATORY, AND LEGAL CONTEXTS
Before we turn to the fundamental issues giving rise to the challenges facing China's antitrust policymakers in enacting the AML, a brief discussion of China's economic, regulatory, and legal contexts in which those issues arise is in order. 19 The formulation of competition policy in a country does not happen in vacuum; instead, it is closely tied to the economic, political, and legal contexts of the country. This is particularly so in China, as the AML is being drafted against the backdrop of China's historic transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market economy.
A. China's Economic Context
When economic reforms started in 1978, China's economy was dominated by the state, and private enterprises played only a negligible role. With factories essentially being units of the state productive machinery, there was little role for competition. At times the government promoted "labor competition" among factories or production units in an effort to indoctrinate the populace with communist ideology, but competition motivated by profits was condemned as a symptom of corrupt capitalist systems.
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A somewhat more detailed but less updated discussion can be found in Owen, Sun & Zheng, id. In 1992, China significantly accelerated its pace of economic reform after the inspection tour of the southern regions by its paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping. In the fall of 1992, the 14 
B. China's Regulatory Context
At the same time that China's economic structure is undergoing fundamental changes, the regulatory structure of China is also being transformed to one more compatible with the requirements of a market economy. Before China's economic reforms, China's economic system was modelled after that of the former Soviet Union. For almost every major industry, a corresponding ministry existed within the government to control, manage, and coordinate the production in that industry. There was no need for government "regulation," as the word is used in the Western countries; the industries were already directly owned and managed by the state. It is when China began to reduce central direction of its economy after the commencement of its economic reforms that China faced the question of what industries to regulate, and how.
Realizing the problems associated with undue government intervention in the economy, the Chinese government has made a strategic choice to retreat from such "non-essential" industries as machinery, electronics, chemicals, and textiles. Those industries do not tend to create conditions of "natural monopoly," do not impinge upon national security and public goods, and usually are not regulated in market economies. In several rounds of government restructuring since 1978, China has gradually dissolved the government ministries overseeing those industries and has replaced them with so-called "chambers of commerce" or "industrial associations" representing and coordinating various interests in those industries.
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In industries considered key to China's national security and economic development, such as electricity, petroleum, banking, insurance, railroads, and aviation, the Chinese government has chosen to retain or strengthen its dominant roles. In those key industries, the dominant firms remain mostly state-owned. As a result, the government plays two roles: it is both the owner of the major players and the referee, i.e., the regulator. This double-role is now seen as detrimental to the development of China's market economy. 
IV. FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN CHINA'S COMPETITION POLICY REFORMS
As we will see below, the most significant competition policy issues in China are inextricably tied to the fundamental issues arising from China's historic transformation from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy. It is those underlying issues, such as the role of state-owned enterprises, perceived excessive competition in China's economy, mergers and acquisitions by foreign companies, the treatment of administrative monopolies, and the enforcement of the antitrust law, that pose the most significant challenges to China's antitrust policymakers in enacting the AML. It is also those fundamental issues-and China's responses to them-that will define the parameters of China's future competition policies.
A. The Role of State-Owned Enterprises
The primary goal of the antitrust law is to encourage competition. It is the lack of competition in China's economy in general and in the state-owned sectors in particular that prompted China to start its efforts to enact a comprehensive antitrust law in the first place.
However, as China has also sought to strengthen the role of SOEs in certain key sectors in recent years, how to bring the SOEs in those sectors into the framework to be established by the new antitrust law seems to have posed a challenge to China's antitrust policymakers.
As noted 
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While China has taken action to reduce the role of SOEs in most economic sectors, in certain sectors deemed to be of strategic importance to China's economy, the control by SOEs is still very significant, and in many cases has even increased. As of 2006, eighty percent of the assets controlled by SOEs were concentrated in eight "strategic sectors" such as petroleum and electricity generation. SOEs accounted for almost all of the production of petroleum, natural gas, and ethylene, provided all of the basic telecommunication services, generated approximately fifty-five percent of electricity, and flew about eighty-two percent of passengers and cargo through the country's air transportation system. SOEs. 29 The government will aim to increase the state capital infusion in those seven industries, and will seek to maintain "absolute control" of them by SOEs. 30 The State Assets Management
Commission also announced that it is China's goal to foster thirty to fifty large "internationally competitive" SOEs in those industries by the year of 2010. 31 In other important industries (but less important than the seven strategic industries), including automobile, steel, and technology, the government will seek to maintain "somewhat strong influence" by state capital on the leading companies.
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So how does China's desire to promote SOEs in strategic and other important sectors fit into its overall antitrust scheme? In particular, will China's professed goal of forming conglomerate SOEs in certain strategic sectors run afoul of the antitrust law, which, according to the latest draft, will outlaw the abuse of market power by monopolies, regardless of ownership status and sectors? How to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory goals-encouraging competition on one hand and maintaining control by SOEs on the other-is a challenge to China's policymakers and is likely to have contributed to the prolonged debate on the draft antitrust law. Finally, it is worth noting that although the new antitrust law could play an important role in opening up many of the sectors currently monopolized by SOEs to new competition, it alone would not be sufficient for China to achieve that goal. First, even if SOEs were to be subject to the new antitrust law, the response to market competition by SOEs depends on the other aspects of SOE reforms, particularly the reforms of SOE ownership structures and the SOE management.
Second, the lack of competition in SOE-controlled sectors to a large degree is caused by the tight control of market entry by the government. A more effective way of promoting competition,
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For example, the federal law of the United States to various degrees grants antitrust immunity to some regulated industries such as insurance, railroad, and ocean transportation, although these exemptions are often criticized. In addition, most developed countries now regard telecommunications services and large parts of the electricity sector as potentially competitive.
therefore, is for the government to relax its control on market entry. It is unclear whether the new antitrust law could compel the government to permit more market entry-presumably through its prohibition of "administrative monopolies," a subject we will return to in section IV.D below. But in any event, the problem of market entry can be solved by the government undertaking self-initiated market entry liberalization measures, of which the Opinions in 2005 is a notable example. Finally, since the government is the ultimate owner of the SOEs and could restructure the SOEs as it chooses, another effective way of promoting competition is for the government to break up the monopolistic SOEs, without resorting to the new antitrust law, just as it did in the restructuring of the telecommunications industry.
B. "Excessive" Competition
In recent years, at the same time that China is trying to curb the monopolistic abuses of SOEs, China's policymakers are increasingly concerned about a new threat-the threat of "excessive" or "malignant" competition in many sectors. To many, this contrast is perplexing. It seems to have created another challenge for Chinese policymakers as they ponder how to deal with two problems that pull in opposite directions.
So-called "excessive competition" is widespread in China. A Google search on the Chinese internet using the Chinese characters for "excessive competition" yielded approximately one million hits, most of which are press reports of the intense competition in various industries.
The industries covered in those press reports are diverse, including software, foods, travel agencies, household appliances, telecommunications, maritime shipping, pharmaceuticals, insurance, banking, waste recycling, machinery, mortgage, motor vehicles, periodicals, supermarkets, internet services, steel, textile and apparels, and even lotteries. The most egregious examples of "malignant competition" reported by the Chinese media are the following: Partly in consequence of perceptions of "excessive" competition in recent years, the government has taken some measures to rein in "excessive competition." Most of those measures involve what is called "industrial self-disciplines," adopted under the direct supervision of the government. Under the practice of "industrial self-disciplines," the major companies in an industry reach price agreements or other agreements to limit competition, in an effort to stabilize the market. 45 The "chambers of commerce" that were converted from government ministries played important roles in the adoption of those "industrial self-disciplines." Indeed, this practice was officially sanctioned by the government in 1998. 46 These efforts mirror the experience of the United States' during the Great Depression, when it was widely believed that excessive competition was responsible for deflationary price pressures and unemployment. At that time, the Roosevelt Administration made various attempts to limit price competition. These policies are now seen as unsound-they were harmful to consumers and probably prolonged the depression, which was not caused by "excessive" competition.
Meanwhile, the government has also stepped up its efforts to limit the competition among export contracts to the respective chambers of commerce for approval prior to export. It is immediately obvious to a student of antitrust that policies such as the "industrial self-disciplines"
and "advance approval" to a large degree function as government-sponsored price cartels.
However, in implementing those policies, the government apparently did not seem to be concerned about their antitrust implications.
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In the face of widespread "excessive competition," some of China's policymakers have questioned whether China needs to have an antitrust law when the competition in most sectors of China's economy is already "excessive." 49 To many, China's problem is not that there is too little competition, but that there is too much. What China needs, they believe, is to consolidate the smaller companies into bigger and stronger ones that can compete in the international markets.
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Although "excessive competition" exists in China's economy, the implication seen by some policymakers-that China may not need the proposed antitrust law-is misguided. The term "excessive competition" is a misnomer. Competition of the kind the antitrust law is intended to promote can never be "excessive." Most examples of "excessive competition" found in China's economy are not examples of there being too much competition; rather, they are examples of competition going awry. Common to almost all those examples of "excessive competition" is the fact that the competitors have engaged in illegal or even criminal acts that violate the existing competition laws, product safety laws and consumer protection laws or would have violated the new antitrust law were it in effect today. The fact that such practices are widespread in China only underscores, rather than detracts from, China's need to strictly enforce the existing laws and to enact the proposed antitrust law. Only through effective enforcement of such laws can competition be channelled to deliver maximum benefits to consumers. In sum, in addressing the "excessive competition" prevalent in its economy, China should focus on ways to change the way competition is carried out, not ways to limit competition itself.
"Excessive competition" in any event does not constitute a reason for not enacting the proposed AML. Instead, the proposed AML will be an important addition to China's toolkit as it tries to promote competition that benefits consumers.
Finally, it will be important for China's policymakers to keep in mind that in addition to strictly enforcing the antitrust laws, broader reforms will be needed to address the root causes of "excessive competition." First, additional SOE reforms will likely have significant impacts on reducing the disruptive competition that in many cases amounts to predatory pricing. It has been noted that China's SOEs are the driving forces behind many of the most notorious examples of "excessive competition," due to their abilities to absorb unlimited losses that purely commercial entities would not be willing or have the ability to absorb. price competition, but not on technological innovation, to attract customers in both domestic and international markets. This puts significant pressures on companies to cut costs, by all means possible, even if such cost-cutting measures would violate product safety laws, consumer protection laws, labor laws or antitrust laws. The lack of technological innovation is a larger problem in China's economy that needs to be dealt with through broader reforms, such as reforms of intellectual property rights protection and even educational reforms. Finally, China's economic growth has been overly relying on investment and export, but not on domestic consumption. Much has been said, rightly or wrongly, about the effect of China's economic growth model on the global structural imbalance, but less attention has been paid to the implications of this economic growth model for China's competition policies. When Chinese consumers consume fewer products or services than producers are willing to supply, the competition among producers can only be expected to intensify. And at a time when China's law enforcement is less than ideal, this intensifying competition will in all likelihood go in the direction of hurting-rather than benefiting-consumers. Broader reforms, such as macroeconomic policy reforms and consumer credit reforms, will likely be helpful in this regard.
C. Mergers and Acquisitions in China by Foreign Companies
Foreign investors have played an important role in China's economic revival since the very beginning of China's economic reforms almost three decades ago. In recent years, however, the role of foreign investment has become more controversial in China, as foreign investors stepped up their efforts to acquire Chinese companies and accelerated their penetration into China's domestic markets. As we will discuss below, this broader debate on the role of foreign investment has important implications for China's antitrust policy. The temptation to rely on competition policy to deal with surging foreign investment leads to another challenge facing China's antitrust policymakers: should the new antitrust law be focused primarily on foreign companies, or should it be applied equally to both foreign and domestic companies? The answer undoubtedly is the latter. While China may rightly be concerned about possible aggressive campaigns by behemoth multinational corporations to monopolize Chinese domestic markets, it would be a grave mistake for the new antitrust law to be intended for-or to be strictly enforced against-foreign companies only. The losses to consumer welfare caused by the anticompetitive acts of domestic companies are no less real than the losses to consumer welfare caused by the anticompetitive acts of foreign companies, and indeed, the degree of monopolization by foreign companies, often exaggerated in the Chinese media, is far less than the degree of monopolization in the industries controlled by SOEs. To focus the new antitrust law only on foreign companies, or to strictly enforce the new antitrust law only against foreign companies, would lead to missed opportunities to address a major source of distortion in China's economy. China's antitrust policymakers should be reminded, therefore, that for the new antitrust law to be of any economic significance, it has to be aimed at domestic companies as much as it is aimed at foreign companies.
D. Treatment of Administrative Monopolies
The most important feature of China's draft antitrust law is the devotion of an entire chapter to the issue of administrative monopolies. Second, administrative monopolies also result from governmental measures that mandate the use of products or services by certain producers, which usually are "affiliate companies" of the government agencies. Those "affiliate companies" are in most cases SOEs or former SOEs currently or previously controlled by the government agencies in question. A good example of this practice is that some local civil affair agencies in charge of issuing marriage licenses require applicants to take pictures to be affixed to marriage licenses only at designated photo studios.
Such steering of business towards affiliated companies using government power is declared illegal under Article 26 of the draft AML.
Third and most important, administrative monopolies also result from governmental actions that restrict market entry. This problem is more serious at the local level, where the local governments are notoriously known for creating various barriers to firms from other localities.
This local protectionism is what is commonly known as "regional blockage" and is declared illegal under Articles 27, 28, and 29.
All of the three variants of administrative monopolies are made possible by the ability of governmental agencies, at both the central and local levels, with or without statutory authority, to require government approvals for a wide range of economic activities. According to a survey conducted by the State Council, as of 2003 there were a total of 4,159 government programs in which approvals of some sort from various governmental agencies were required, and more than 2,000 approval requirements were implemented without any legal basis. 63 To make things worse, in many cases businesses have to navigate through the maze of those approval requirements without clear guidance from the governmental agencies.
How serious is the problem of administrative monopolies in China? The following statistics provide a clue. It is reported that since 1993, the SAIC investigated 5,642 cases of monopolies pursuant to the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, 519 of which were administrative 62 However, the ban on discount air tickets was frequently ignored by the airlines, and the ban was finally lifted in early 2003. protectionism and "regional blockade," will it be able to overcome the "central versus local governments" problem that it has not been able to overcome in the last 3,000 years? The answer is obvious.
Moreover, if China does include administrative monopolies in the draft AML, it will face another kind of credibility problem, this time pointing in the opposite direction. If the government knows that it will not be able to enforce the prohibition of administrative monopolies and yet still includes it in the law, it may send a signal to the public that it does not
68
The relationship between the central and local governments has been problematic since the Zhou Dynasty (1,122 B.C.-225 B.C.) and has remained so until today. One of the most dramatic episodes of the "central versus local governments" problem is the civil war waged by Emperor Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty in the 1670s against three feudal lords, who were granted their fiefdoms as rewards for their contributions to the establishment of the Qing Dynasty but who later grew defiant of the orders of the Emperor. The war, spanning eight years and spreading to almost half of China's territory at the time, ended with a complete victory of the Emperor.
expect to strictly enforce every provision of the law. As a result, the public may discount the government's resolve in enforcing the new law as a whole. No matter whether the prohibition of administrative monopolies is included in the AML or not, it is clear that China's antitrust policymakers will face difficult issues either way. These difficult issues may have been the primary reason behind the current gridlock on the draft AML.
But whatever decision China's policymakers may make with respect to administrative monopolies, they need to be fully aware of the consequences and implications of their decision.
On one hand, if China's antitrust policymakers eventually decide to exclude administrative monopolies from the AML, it will be important for them to keep in mind that such a decision will not be an endorsement of administrative monopolies, and nor will it be a decision to do nothing about them. It will simply be an acknowledgment of the fact that the AML cannot cure all evils in one swoop, at least not at this time. A decision to not address administrative monopolies in the AML will not make the AML irrelevant, either. Although administrative monopolies undoubtedly are the major source of monopolistic behavior in China's economy today, anticompetitive acts by economic entities that do not have government power are nonetheless very significant, and more importantly, are growing. As the government further retreats from the economy, antitrust issues will be created increasingly not by the government, but by economic entities such as commercialized SOEs, private enterprises, and foreign companies. By focusing on antitrust problems arising from economic behavior at this time,
China essentially would start on a path with the least resistance, as it did with its general economic reforms three decades ago. The hope is that the early success of reforms will create benefits to a wide swath of society and rebalance the distribution of vested interests in society, so much so that reforms that were previously unconceivable may become realistic goals later. That is the essence of the Chinese-style incremental improvements that have worked so well in China's general economic reforms so far. When it comes to antitrust, the same incremental approach may be worth a try.
On the other hand, if China's antitrust policymakers eventually decide to address administrative monopolies in the AML, it will be important for them not to expect immediate success. Administrative monopolies are such a problem in China that any success in dealing with them is likely to come about only incrementally. It is also important for the Chinese policymakers to not see the AML as the sole vehicle or even the most important vehicle through which to address administrative monopolies. 69 The nature of administrative monopolies means that their elimination will necessarily require other reforms, such as constitutional and government structure reforms. Indeed, in most developed countries, such as in the United States, administrative monopolies are dealt with in the general antitrust law only to the extent that they are a result of the action of the state as market participant. In dealing with monopolistic conditions created by the state as sovereignty and market regulator, the United States generally leaves the job to the democratic legislative processes at both the federal and state levels, while using certain important legal mechanisms-such as the "Dormant Commerce Clause" 70 and the federalism doctrine 71 -to correct any failures of the democratic processes in this regard.
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It seems that China's antitrust policymakers are well aware of this point. Article 6 of the current draft AML points out that the furtherance of reforms of the government functions are needed to rein in the abuse of administrative power that harms competition. This seems to indicate a recognition among Chinese authorities that administrative monopolies are not something that will be cured by the AML alone. be established. 76 No matter who will become the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency, however, it will be wise to have one instead of two enforcement agencies, as a single enforcement agency avoids the potential inconsistency that may be created in a dual enforcement structure.
In addition to the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency, the current draft AML proposes the establishment of an Antimonopoly Commission directly under the State Council. The
Antimonopoly Commission is intended to be an advisory body staffed by high level officials from different government agencies. The day-to-day AML enforcement activities will be carried out by the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency.
The establishment of the new Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency will necessarily result in diminished roles for the agencies currently responsible for antitrust enforcement and regulatory supervision. Perhaps to reduce the resistance from these agencies, the current draft makes the compromise that monopolistic activities subject to the AML that are also within the scope of other regulatory agencies' investigative power based on other laws and administrative regulations will be investigated by those other agencies, and these other agencies are required to report their enforcement results to the Antimonopoly Commission. The Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency investigates such matters only when they are not investigated by other agencies. However, this compromise would eliminate one of the major advantages of the AML over the current fragmented antitrust laws-i.e., a uniform enforcement agency that can be counted on enforcing the antitrust law in a consistent and predictable manner. Similar provisions of US law have not been successful in promoting competition in regulated industries. Because of regulatory capture, regulators often seek to protect regulated firms from outside entry and from competition among themselves. Giving these regulators exclusive jurisdiction to enforce antitrust law within their jurisdictions will likely result in competition taking a back seat to industry interests.
Which Enforcement Priorities?
Given the limited institutional capability and resources at least at the initial stage, China's future Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency will need to set priorities for its enforcement goals.
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See Article 5 of the current draft of the AML.
A good start is to focus first on horizontal restraints of trade, especially cases of price fixing and bid rigging, where large benefits can often be obtained for consumers by breaking up the cartels and introducing competition. Enforcement in this area has high payoffs because it is likely to deter behavior that harms consumers and unlikely to erroneously deter competitive behavior that benefits consumers.
In countries with new competition policies, there is often a tendency to focus on complex vertical relationships because of complaints about these matters filed by competitors, and consumer protection issues because of great popular appeal. Oftentimes, certain contracts or contractual terms, or pricing schemes in general, may strike people as unfair, even if they actually promote economic efficiency. Examples include vertical price restraints, unilateral refusals to deal, certain tying arrangements, "unfairly high price in selling or unfairly low price in purchasing," predatory pricing, and price discrimination. 77 In societies that are skeptical of the legitimacy of markets, enforcement focusing on these issues often illustrates the popular or ideological basis for the skepticism. Antitrust action in these areas requires painstaking investigation and analysis, not merely to decide whether the behavior in question is harmful or beneficial to consumers, but to avoid creating unintended deterrent effects on future economic activity that is beneficial to consumers. In general, it is important to resist the temptation to give priority to investigations that consume a vast amount of resources but have minimal benefits.
Although the antitrust review of proposed mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures is a very useful device to avoid anticompetitive concentration without the messy complication of ex post disassembly of a consummated transaction, the amount of work involved can easily be overwhelming. Unfortunately, the current draft AML applies to all consolidations that meet the sales thresholds rather than just consolidations of competing firms. The effect could be to unnecessarily burden the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency and increase the delays associated with obtaining agency clearance for mergers with little or no potential for anticompetitive effects, including many beneficial mergers. It is important for the Antimonopoly Enforcement those that have clear overlaps. This implies the need for a limit on the amount of time transactions are held up pending agency decisions on enforcement.
The Importance of Transparency and Consistency
For the AML to influence business behavior in the intended way, businesses need to form both correct and clear expectations about enforcement. An earlier draft of the AML states that "the enforcement authority should publish its decisions," a requirement that makes sense only if the published opinions are intended (as they should be) to influence future behavior of business firms. Publication of decisions and the reasoning behind them, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective deterrence. It is also necessary to have a rule that serves the purpose, in a common law system, of "stare decisis." That is, the enforcement authority must to some extent be bound by its prior decisions and reasoning. If prosecutors (or courts) can decide each case without regard to the ways in which similar facts have been analyzed and treated in the recent past, private firms have no basis to form expectations about the consequences of their actions. The effect of this is to increase the risks of doing business, thus discouraging investment by ruling out investment projects that do not have a sufficiently high expected return to compensate investors for taking on the risk of (erroneous) antitrust prosecution.
The requirement to publish enforcement decisions would be a good first step to implement the AML in a transparent and consistent way. However, the current draft has changed this language to "the enforcement authority may publish its decisions." This subtle change seems to reflect a reluctance of the Chinese authorities to commit to full disclosure of its future antitrust decisions, which is not helpful for private firms attempting to form expectations about the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency's actions. This retreat from a firm commitment to transparency and consistency may reflect the consideration that China's antitrust authorities may well take into account other non-competition factors, such as public interest and the health of the national economy, in deciding competition cases, as stated in the draft AML. But here as well, making the enforcement agency responsible for such broad considerations may be a mistake. The agency's decisions will be subject to political review, and it is in that review process that such considerations may enter.
More generally, unless antitrust enforcers are to attempt to examine every transaction in the economy, deterrence is the principal vector by which antitrust (and most other) laws achieve their effects on economic behavior. Deterrence of anticompetitive behavior, however, has a dark side: inadvertent deterrence of efficient behavior. The deterrent effect of a law or regulation is affected by the probability of detection and successful prosecution (itself a function of enforcement resources), the firm's understanding of the law, and the penalties expected to result from successful prosecution. Very effective deterrence of anticompetitive behavior will also deter pro-competitive behavior if the law is unclear to private decision-makers or if private decision-makers anticipate frequent errors by prosecutors and judges. 78 Thus, transparency and consistency in enforcement are important in helping businesses form the right expectations.
The proposed law clearly contemplates reliance on administrative rather than judicial machinery as its primary enforcement mechanism, and calls for the enforcement agency to issue detailed rules and regulations to implement the law. In the end, given China's legal environment, as discussed in section III.C, it is these rules and their enforcement that will matter most. It would be inappropriate to evaluate the proposed law as if it were, as it would be in the U.S., a set of instructions intended for the judiciary to interpret.
In the current draft AML, private parties are given the right to judicial review if they are not satisfied with the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency's decisions. Private parties are also entitled to recover damages resulting from monopolistic behavior. In the context of China's current legal system, it remains unclear whether this right increases or decreases the predictability of the process and therefore the potential for promotion of economic efficiency and growth. It is not clear what level of the courts will handle such appeals and lawsuits or whether the courts' decisions will be final. In general, the courts' ability to adjudicate antitrust cases is doubtful at this time, as they do not seem to have the necessary expertise.
China's antitrust policymakers are aware of the inadequate capacity of the courts in adjudicating antitrust cases under the AML. In some earlier drafts, civil liabilities and recovery of damages through litigation were emphasized. One draft even suggested a detailed methodology of computing damages. Later drafts, however, minimized direct mentions of the courts' role. Apparently there is hesitance to rely on the judicial system to handle antitrust cases. To the extent administrative agencies are more competent in carrying out the AML enforcement, it makes sense at least in the short term to rely more on administrative decisions and remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
China has come a long way since the drafting process of the AML began in 1994.
Compared with China's current antitrust laws, the draft AML made significant progress in terms of comprehensiveness, clarity, and consistency with economic principles. Despite the progress, China's antitrust policymakers still face significant challenges in reforming the country's competition policies. Those challenges implicate many of the most fundamental issues arising from China's transformation from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy. The resolution of those issues, however, needs not precede the adoption of the new AML.
Meanwhile, while the AML will be an important tool to carry out China's competition policy reforms, it is not the only one. Other reforms, such as SOE reforms, market entry reforms, constitutional and government structure reforms, and legal reforms, to name a few, will be indispensable to China's goal of promoting competition in its economy. In light of the complexity of the issues in China's competition policy reforms, it will be important for China's antitrust policymakers to not expect the AML to cure all evils in one swoop. Rather, China will be better served to take an incremental approach and enact an AML that is tailored to China's current realities, while keeping the momentum to engage in other reforms necessary to fully implement China's competition policy goals.
